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ABSTRACT 
I investigate the effects of financial statement comparability on the value of 
cash holdings. Based on a sample of US firms in 1990-2013, I find that firms 
with comparable financial statement exhibit statistically and economically 
higher market value for incremental dollar in hand. Further, I find that 
comparable firms exhibit higher return on asset subsequent to holding and 
using excess cash than non-comparable counterparts, that comparable firms 
tend to use cash more in capital expenditure, and that such capital expenditure 
is more value enhancing. Additionally, the effect of financial statement 
comparability accentuates during crisis period (2008-2009) compared to non-
crisis period (1990-2007, 2010-2013). Overall this study suggests that the 
financial statement comparability is an important attribute of accounting 
information that serves to mitigate the free cash flow problem. 
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Regulators and academics underscores the benefits of comparable accounting information 
and advocate that accounting information be comparable. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB, 1980) defines comparability as a unique attribute of accounting 
information that enables decision makers to “identify similarities and differences between 
two sets of economic phenomena” (FASB paragraphs S12) and states that decision-useful 
accounting information is comparable. Similarly, in academia, scholars are generally in 
agreement that there exist merits and benefits of comparable accounting information. For 
example, prior studies document that financial statement comparability (hereafter 
comparability) improve the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts (De Franco, Kothari, 
and Verdi 2011), reduce debt cost of capital (Kim, Kraft, and Ryan 2013), help acquirer 
make better acquisition decision (Chen, Collins, Kravet, and Mergenthaler 2016), and 
enhance informativeness of stock prices about future earnings (Choi, Choi, Myers, and 
Ziebart 2017). These studies, combined together, suggest that comparability reduces 
information asymmetry among market participants so that they can make more accurate 
decisions.  
Extrapolating from this line of research, I hypothesize and test whether 
comparable accounting information is also beneficial in mitigating agency problem. In 
particular, I argue that comparability reduces agency cost associated with cash. Cash and 
cash equivalent (hereafter cash) is a form of asset that is most highly exposed to agency 
problem (Jensen 1986; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
2007). Due to its high convertibility, self-interested managers can use cash for their own 
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benefits without tight scrutiny (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007), leading to inefficient 
investment. Jensen (1986) defines such problem as the free cash flow problem: cash excess 
of that required to fund all projects with positive net present value (NPV) is exposed to 
agency problem between managers and shareholders. Therefore, investors, aware of the 
fact, discount the value of excess cash, unless they are convinced that the cash on hand 
will be utilized for their own benefit, or that the asset is well “fenced in” (Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith 2007; Louis, Sun, and Urcan 2012; Kim, Lee, and Park 2015; Gao and Jia 
2016). As a result, the market value of additional dollar in cash is generally less than one 
dollar (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007).  
In this paper, I posit that if firms are more comparable to one another, the 
managers’ intention for holding cash will become more transparent. Prior studies suggest 
comparability reduces information asymmetry among market participants (De Franco et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2017). With comparable accounting 
information, outsiders can make better inference about managerial behavior, reducing 
managerial incentive for expropriation and mitigating agency problem (Hölmstrom 1979). 
In such a case, managers are likely to seek more efficient and effective use of cash to 
prevent any penalty associated with inefficient accumulation or disbursement of cash. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, cash will be more beneficial to shareholders, and if a firm holds 
excess cash, there would be legitimate value enhancing reason for it. Consequently, the 
value of cash holdings will be higher in comparable firms 
I empirically examine this prediction with a large sample of 37,995 firm-year 
observations over the sample period of 1990-2013. I find that the market value of 
additional dollar is significantly higher for firms that exhibit higher financial reporting 
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comparability proxied by De Franco et al.’s (2011) measure. Specifically, a transition from 
the lowest comparability decile to the highest decile corresponds to an increase of about 
30 cents in the market value of additional dollar. Consistent with the finding, I also 
document that comparability is positively associated with the value of excess cash.  
To shed light on the mechanism that comparability leads to higher market value 
of cash, I conduct three sets of additional analyses. In these analyses, I examine how the 
cash of comparable firm is used in firms’ operating activities. Employing tests from De 
Franco et al. (2011) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009), I document (1) that among firms that 
hold excess cash at time t and reduce their cash between year t and t+1 (i.e., spend their 
cash), comparable firms tend to exhibit higher return on asset (ROA) in year t+4, and such 
effect perpetuates for two fiscal years, (2) that comparable firms tends to exhibit higher 
capital expenditure sensitivity to cash holdings, (3) and that such capital expenditure is 
more value enhancing for comparable firms. This set of analyses suggests that comparable 
firms accumulate and disburse cash in a fashion that is more beneficial to shareholders and 
that the market anticipating such enhanced value gives premium on the cash holdings.    
In further analysis, I document that the effect of financial statement comparability 
is more pronounced in recent financial crisis period (i.e., 2008 – 2009) than in non-crisis 
period (i.e., 1990 – 2007 and 2010 – 2013). Prior studies suggest that liquid asset 
contributes more to firm value during financial crisis, when capital market is not 
functioning properly, and thus raising capital is costlier (Campello, Graham, and Harvey 
2010; Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey 2011). My finding suggests that the 
effect of comparability on the value of cash holdings accentuates when cash is more 
valuable to firms, confirming the importance of comparable accounting information.  
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Additionally, I document that the effect of financial statement comparability is 
robust to controlling for strength of corporate governance measured by G-Index (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick 2003), accrual quality by modifed Dechow and Dichev measure 
(Dechow and Dichev 2001; McNichols 2001), accounting conservatism by ratio of non-
operating accruals to total assets cumulated over previous three years (Givoly and Hayn 
2000), and alternative measures of comparability (Barth et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2017). In 
fact, the effect of financial statement comparability on the value of cash holdings is 
pronounced in firms with strong corporate governance.    
I contribute to the literature in several ways. First and foremost, this study 
provides evidence, albeit indirect, that comparable financial statement generates a benefit 
in mitigating the free cash flow problem, a typical agency problem that firms face. While 
prior studies shed light on different benefits of comparability, my finding suggest that 
comparability plays a role in relieving agency problem. Comparable accounting 
information facilitates comparison across peers and information transfer across firms such 
that in equilibrium managers conduct less in managerial misconduct associated with cash. 
Since Jensen (1986) first proposed the free cash flow problem, academics have sought 
ways to address and alleviate the problem (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Louis et al. 
2012; Kim et al. 2015; Gao and Jia, 2016). I add to this line of research by providing 
evidence that comparable accounting information facilitates investors to make inference 
based on peer firm such that managers’ incentive for self-interested behavior is reduced, 
and, as a result, the free cash flow problem is mitigated. Kim, Li, Lu, and Yu (2016) suggest 
that comparability is effective in mitigating managers’ bad-news-hoarding behavior, 
another form of agency problem. My finding is consistent with this study in that I provide 
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another benefit of comparable accounting information in agency framework.  
Second, I contribute to the literature on the governance role of accounting 
information. In classical agency framework, the amount of information is directly related 
to seriousness of moral hazard problem; the more information available, the more effective 
control mechanism. (Hölmstrom 1979). In similar vein, Bushman and Smith (2001) define 
the governance role of accounting information as the use of accounting information as an 
input to governance mechanism that monitors and alleviate agency problem, and call for 
future research to provide further evidence that accounting information serve such role. 
My finding responses to this call and provides additional evidence of the governance role 
of accounting information.   
Finally, I add to the line of literature that suggests that comparability is associated 
with investment efficiency. Chen et al. (2016) suggest that when target firm’s financial 
statement exhibits greater comparability, the acquirer makes better acquisition decision. 
Related but distinct from such phenomenon, I document that managers of firm with 
comparable financial statement spend more cash in capital expenditure and that the capital 
expenditure is more value enhancing. This finding is consistent with the findings of Biddle, 
Callahan, Hong, and Knowles (2016), which claim that the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with improved investment efficiency. 
My finding, combined with prior studies, suggests that financial statement comparability 
has real effect in economy.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the prior 
literature review and develops my hypothesis. Section 3 is dedicated to my research 
methodology. Section 4 present my sample and descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides 
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my empirical results and robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
2.1. Financial statement comparability 
Both conceptual framework of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principle in the United 
States (US-GAAP) and IFRS emphasize the importance of comparable information in 
decision making. The US-GAAP states that comparability, defined as “the quality of 
information that enables users to identify similarities in and differences between two sets 
of economic phenomena”, is a decision-useful quality of financial reporting information 
(FASB 1980). The rationale behind such argument is straightforward. Since economic 
decision, in nature, requires comparison between alternatives, the usefulness of accounting 
information in different settings - investment, credit, and other resource allocation decision 
- is inevitably related to comparability of the information (FASB 1980). IFRS underscores 
the importance of comparable information in similar fashion, saying that comparability 
along with verifiability, timeliness, and understandability enhances usefulness of 
accounting information (IFRS 2010). In summary, the accounting information is most 
likely to be useful for outside investors when it can be easily compared with information 
pertaining to other entity in the same period or to the same entity in other period (FASB 
1980). 
 Consistent with the emphasis placed by standard setters, researchers have paid 
attention to implication of financial statement comparability (De Franco et al. 2011; Kim 
et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2016). Specifically, employing or modifying a 
measure put forth by De Franco et al. (2011), prior studies have found (1) that 
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comparability is positively (negatively) associated with analyst following and forecast 
accuracy (analysts’ dispersion in earnings forecast) (Bradshaw, Miller, and Serafeim 2009; 
De Franco et al. 2011), (2) that the greater comparability is related to lower estimated bid-
ask spreads for traded bonds, lower credit spreads for bonds and five-year CDS, and a 
steeper one- to five- year CDS term structure (Kim et al. 2013), that (3) in syndicated loan 
market, comparability is negatively associated with loan spread and the likelihood of 
pledging collateral, and positively associated with loan maturity and the likelihood of 
including performance pricing provisions in loan contract (Fang, Li, Xin, and Zhang 2016), 
(4) that acquirers with higher comparability target firms enjoys higher merger 
announcement return, higher acquisition synergies, and better future operating 
performance (Chen et al. 2016), (5) that comparability reduces ex-ante stock price crash 
risk (Kim et al. 2016), and (6) that comparability improve stock price informativeness 
about future earnings (Choi et al. 2017). Constant theme of this line of research is that 
comparability constitutes an important building block of the information environment1; 
investors of the firms with more comparable financial reporting can make more precise 
inferences about the operating and financing activities of the firm, and thus the value of 
the firm.  
                                           
1 Recent studies also investigate the effect of IFRS adoption as a quasi-experiment that enhances 
comparability. Some examples of such studies include (1) DeFond, Hu, Fung, and Li (2011), which 
argue that IFRS adoption increase foreign mutual fund ownership, (2) Ozkan, Singer, and You (201), 
which argue that the use of relative performance evaluation increases with IFRS adoption, (3) 
Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim (2013), which argue that analysts’ information environment is 
enhanced, (4) Barth, Landsman, Lang and Williams (2013), which suggest IFRS adoption increases 
firm-specific information and stock market liquidity, (5) Biddle et al. (2016), which suggest that 
IFRS adoption increases investment efficiency, and (6) Young and Zeng (2015), which suggest that 
accuracy of peer-based valuation increases with IFRS adoption.   
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2.2. Value of cash holdings  
Prior research on the value of an additional cash holdings stresses two opposing forces. On 
the one hand, one stream of research underscores the relation between the difficulty of 
external financing and the value of cash holdings. Adopting a perspective that the cash is 
negative “debt”, prior studies suggest that the value of cash holdings is positively related 
to financial constraint and cost of external financing (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 
2007; Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2009). Researchers argue that 
under-investment problem prevails if a firm is under heavy financial constraint, or if the 
firm faces high external financing cost. In such cases, contribution of additional dollar to 
the market value of a firm is greater than one dollar, because it allows additional investment, 
which, otherwise, would have been foregone. Thus, the value of cash holdings is heavily 
affected by the difficulty of external financing or by cost of capital. 
 On the other hand, another stream of research relates the value of cash holdings 
to seriousness of a form of agency problem: the free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986). 
Cash is a form of asset that is convertible to virtually all other forms of asset, and thus is 
most at risk of managements’ expropriation (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). Such rent-
extractions by managers may take different forms: inefficient investment such as value 
decreasing acquisition (Harford 1999), unnecessary diversification (Amihud and Lev 
1981), and excess investment in project that requires manager’s specific human capital 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). But what these expropriations have in common is that they are 
value-decreasing expansion of firms’ operation, or empire-building activities that increase 
manager’s private benefit (e.g., sphere of control) at the expense of shareholders’ value. In 
addition, falsely satisfied with excess cash on hand, the management may become less 
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pressured to reduce costs, to improve margins, to closely monitor employees, and to 
extensively engage in profitable investments (Harford 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
2007). In either cases, the implication for the market valuation of additional dollar is 
identical: a dollar in a firm is worth less than a dollar to outside investors.  
Sharing a concern that the free cash flow problem is detrimental to shareholder 
value, prior studies look for mechanisms that can mitigate the problem. Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) examines whether a firm with better corporate governance mechanism has a 
better protection against managerial appropriation or inefficiency. They document that 
properly governed firms enjoy more than double the value of a dollar compared to firms 
with poor corporate governance mechanism. Probing the same research question in cross-
country setting, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) document that firms located in 
countries with poor investor protection exhibit a significantly lower value of cash holdings 
than firms located in countries with strong investor protection.  
Accounting researchers also start to look into the issue by investigating the role 
of accounting information in mitigating the problem. Extrapolating from prior literature 
on accounting conservatism and financial reporting quality that investigate roles of such 
attributes in agency framework, Louis et al. (2012) and Sun, Yung, and Rahman (2012) 
find that accounting conservatism and financial reporting quality are positively related to 
the value of cash holdings. Other studies also relate internal and external monitoring on 






2.3. Relation between financial statement comparability and the value of cash 
holdings 
Extrapolating from prior literature, I try to fill in the missing link between the financial 
statement comparability and the value of cash holdings. Unlike the extensive attention on 
the relation between value of cash holdings and other proxies for the quality of accounting 
information, the relation between the financial statement comparability and the value of 
cash holdings is unexplored. In fact, there exist only a few findings that support the 
effectiveness of comparability in agency framework (Kim et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2016).  
 In theoretical perspective, there are reasons to believe that comparable accounting 
information is effective in mitigating agency problem, and in particular the free cash flow 
problem. With comparable accounting information, market participants, such as analysts 
and investors, are in better positions to identify similarities and differences between peer 
firms. That is, if accounting information is comparable, then the information processing 
and acquisition cost for market participants are substantially reduced (De Franco et al. 
2011), such that the information, market participants can engage in effective monitoring. 
In particular, they can closely monitor a firm’s intention for holding cash by comparing 
the level of cash and operating/investing activities of the firm with its peers. It will be 
clearer whether the accumulation of cash or expenditure of cash is for manager’s private 
rent-seeking purpose or for the benefit of shareholders. Additionally, with comparable 
accounting information, market participants better understand the operating activities of a 
firm, and thus in better positions to predict the firm’s future profitability precisely (Choi 
et al. 2017). For example, De Franco et al. (2011) suggest that analysts forecast is more 
accurate when accounting information is comparable. This will help analysts evaluate the 
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profitability of the investment that a firm is currently undertaking and will undertake in the 
future.2 In summary, with comparable accounting information, market participants (1) 
better determine whether the intention for holding cash is justifiable and (2) better evaluate 
whether existing and imminent investment project, in which current cash holdings are 
expected to be used, are profitable. The managers, aware of such tight scrutiny, will behave 
accordingly. They will be deterred from over-investment problem that Jensen (1986) 
suggest, and will be cautious and efficient in picking investment project, as opposed to 
falsely satisfied and less pressured for efficiency, a phenomenon that Harford (1999) and 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) document. Therefore, in equilibrium, cash holdings of 
comparable firms will be more beneficial to shareholders, and consequently shareholders 
will place more value to cash on hand.3    
                                           
2 Note that NPV of an investment project requires projection, or forecast, of future cash flow, or 
alternatively projection, or forecast, of earnings, if residual income model is used (Ohlson 1995). 
Therefore, with better prediction of earnings, profitability of an investment project can be better 
evaluated.  
3 However, as the value of cash holdings is also a function of the cost of capital, one cannot 
unambiguously predict the overall effect of the comparability on the value of cash holdings to the 
extent that the comparability affects the cost of debt capital (Kim et al. 2013; Fang et al. 2016). 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that the value of cash holdings is sensitive to cost of external 
financing. In imperfect market, cash plays a role as a buffer in external financing. Given abundant 
cash in hand, a firm doesn’t have to incur transaction cost to invest in positive NPV projects; it can 
invest with the cash in hand immediately. But this comes at a cost of foregoing interest that could 
otherwise be earned. Thus, the firm, without agency problem, will only choose to hold additional 
cash only when external financing is sufficiently expensive (Opler et al. 1999). This implies that 
the higher (the lower) the cost of capital, the greater (smaller) the importance of cash at hand. To 
the extent that higher comparability facilitates provision of information in debt market and reduces 
cost of external financing (Kim et al. 2013; Fang et al. 2016), the value of cash holdings may be 
negatively associated with a firm becomes more comparable. I do not develop this prediction as an 
alternative hypothesis because there is a lot more prior literature that support the prediction based 
on the agency framework. My empirical findings also do not support this prediction. 
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H1: The financial statement comparability is positively related to the value of  
   cash holdings.  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1. Measuring financial statement comparability  
De Franco et al. (2011) argue that accounting system is a mapping from economic event 
to financial statement and that comparability is defined as the closeness of these mappings 
between two firms, given an economic event. Exploiting the idea, De Franco et al. (2011) 
develop an empirical measure of financial statement comparability. In this paper, I follow 
De Franco et al. (2011) and use their measure. In particular, I first run time-serious 
regression using firm i’s 16 previous quarterly earnings and stock return:   
      𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (1) 
where 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the quarterly net income before extraordinary item deflated by the 
market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is stock return over 
the quarter. The estimated intercept (𝛼?̂?) and coefficient (𝛽?̂?) from equation (1) proxy for 
firm i’s accounting system. Likewise, I compute accounting system for firm j in the same 
two-digit SIC classification. To measure the closeness between these two accounting 
systems, I take the economic event of firm i (i.e., 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡) as given and compute the 
expected earnings from each accounting systems (i.e., that of firm i and firm j) for previous 
16 quarters: 
       𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖,𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡              (2) 
       𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
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The pairwise closeness (i.e., comparability score) between firm i’s and firm j’s accounting 
mappings given firm i’s economic event is measured as the negative one (-1) times average 
of the difference between expected earnings given firm i’s return over previous 16 quarters:  
       𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  −
1
16
 ∑ |𝐸𝑡𝑡−15 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|          (4) 
The firm-level comparability of firm i in year t is measured as, (1) the median 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 of all possible combination with firm i within the same two-digit SIC 
classification ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ), (2) the average 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  of all possible 
combination with firm i within the same two-digit SIC classification 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡), and (3) the average 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 of four closest firm j’s in the 
same two-digit SIC classification (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡).  
 Consistent with Chen et al. (2014) and Kim et al. (2016), I convert comparability 
measures into deciles and then normalized them so that they range between [0, 1] to 
address potential non-linearity and noise and to facilitate economic interpretation.4  
 
3.2. Assessing the market value of cash holdings5 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) document that the value of additional dollar in cash is related 
to a number of factors. My hypothesis suggest that the value of cash holdings vary with 
                                           
4 My results are robust to using continuous measures of comparability. 
5 Prior studies on value of cash uses extended Fama and French (1998) specification to estimate 
the value of cash (Pinkowitz and Williamson 2004; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamsom 2006; Gao 
and Jia 2016). However, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2009) suggest that the specification suffers from 
potential endogeneity problem as the level of cash is endogenously determined with the Market-to-
book ratio, which is correlated with investment opportunities. In light of the criticism, I use Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2009) model and use the extended Fama and French (1998) model to estimate 
the value of excess cash.  
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the level of comparability. I, accordingly, employ Faulkender and Wang (2006) model and 
extend it by including comparability measures (i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 




) . Specifically, I employ the following regression model:  
       𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡




































               +𝛼13×COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
(5) 
where for firm i in year t,6  
COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡 = Financial statement comparability, measured using either 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖𝑡  , or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖𝑡  . 
Comparability measures are decile-ranked and normalized to range 
between [0, 1] 
Control Variable = Change in cash (∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡), change in earnings (∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡), change in total 
asset net of cash (∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) , change in R&D expenditure (∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡) , 
change in interest expense ( ∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡) , change in common dividend 
(∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡), cash balance at the end of the previous year (𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1), new 
finance from year t-1 to year t (𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡) , and interaction terms of 
lagged cash and leverage with change in cash ( 𝐶𝑖,𝑡×∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ,  and 
                                           
6 Throughout the paper, year means fiscal year. 
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𝐿𝑖,𝑡×∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡), all deflated by market value of firm at year t-1 (𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1) 
except for leverage  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵   = Annual excess return measured over 12-month period ending three 
months after the fiscal year-end minus benchmark portfolio return 
during the same period. The benchmark portfolio return is measured 
by the equally weighted average return of Fama and French’s (1993) 
25 size and book-to-market portfolio  
Detailed definitions of variables are to be found in the appendix. 
 Equation (5) estimates the stock market reaction to unexpected changes in cash 
holdings during a year (Faulkender and Wang 2006). This is because the expected cash 
level in year t is assumed to be the cash level in the previous year. Note that all the 
independent variables are deflated by the lagged market value of equity. Thus, the 
coefficient on change in cash (
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
) can be interpreted as the change in the market value 
of equity associated with an (unexpected) extra dollar increase in cash holdings, or 
alternatively, marginal market value of cash. Faulkender and Wang (2006) add other 
explanatory variables to control for a firm’s characteristics that have effects on the value 
of cash: characteristics associated with operating, investing, and financing activities.  
 The interaction terms capture the variables that affect the value of cash holdings. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that the market value of cash decreases with current cash 
level and with financial leverage. That is, the value that an incremental dollar creates 
decreases as the seriousness of underinvestment problem declines.  
 My hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the interaction term between De 
Franco et al.’s (2011) comparability measures and the change in cash (α13) are positive 
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and statistically significant. 7  That is, the higher the comparability, the greater the 
contribution of additional dollar on hand.  
 In all of the regression analyses, I wisorize each continuous variable at the 1st and 
99th percentile to address potential problem that extreme outliers may bring. 
  
4. SAMPLE AND DATA  
4.1. Sample selection 
My sample includes firm-year observations during the period 1990 -2013. I obtain 
financial statement data from COMPUSTAT and security price data from Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), I exclude 
financial firms and utility firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 
4999, respectively). I also excluded firm-year observations that show negative market 
value of equity and negative total asset net of cash. Following De Franco et al. (2011), I 
restrict each firm-year observation to have at least 10 pairs in two-digit SIC code industries 
to compute the comparability measures. I also delete top and bottom 1 percent from 
comparability distribution consistent with prior studies on comparability (De Franco et al. 
2011; Choi et al. 2017). Finally, I exclude firm-year observation that doesn’t have requisite 
regression variables.  
                                           
7  As articulated, the comparability may reduce the debt cost of capital, which is positively 
associated with the value of cash. In such case, the coefficient on the interaction term (α13) will be 
positive only if comparability is effective in mitigating the free cash flow problem and such effect 
is greater than the effect of comparability in reducing cost of debt capital. On the other hand, if 
comparability is not effective mechanism in mitigating the free cash flow problem, or if the effect 
is smaller than the effect of comparability on reducing cost of debt capital, then the coefficient (α13) 
will be negative and statistically significant. 
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4.2. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1, Panel A provides summary statistics for variables used throughout my paper. The 
distributions of main variables are consistent with prior studies (Faulkender and Wang 
2006; De Franco et al. 2007; Louis et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2015; Choi et al. 2017). The 
average excess (raw) return is 0.9% (19.1%) whereas median is -7.2% (7.0%), which is 
consistent with Louis et al.’s (2012) descriptive statistics. The average of annual excess 
return is close to zero as it is defined as raw return excess of Fama and French (1993) 
benchmark portfolio. The mean (median) values of De Franco et al.’s (2011) comparability 
measures (i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡)  are -
2.734, -3.508, and -0.741, respectively. The distribution of each of the comparability 
measures are negatively skewed, consistent with De Franco et al. (2011). Average change 
in cash and earnings are, albeit small in magnitude, positive consistent with the prior 
studies’ finding that firms tend to increase their cash holdings over time and that firms’ 
performances improve over time. Table 1, Panel B provides distribution of my firm-year 
observations over fiscal years. It shows that my sample is fairly uniformly distributed over 
time, alleviating a concern that year effect is driving the result.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 Table 2 provides Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix. Consistent with prior 
studies (De Franco et al. 2011; Choi et al. 2017), the comparability measures are highly 
correlated to one another, confirming that they are conceptually capturing the same effect. 
Additionally, comparability measures are highly correlated with other explanatory 
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variables. Thus, omission of comparability measure may introduce the correlated omitted 
variable problem.   
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULT  
Throughout this paper, I employ robust regression, cluster standard errors at firm level, 
and introduce industry and year fixed effects (Petersen 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 
2010).  
 
5.1. Financial statement comparability and the value of cash holdings 
Table 3 presents the regression result for equation (5). As a benchmark, the column (1) of 
table 3 presents replication of Faulkender and Wang (2006). Consistent with their finding, 
a (unexpected) change of a dollar in cash is associated with approximately a dollar change 
in market value. On average a dollar increase in cash is associated with $1.001 in market 
value of cash, ceteris paribus. Consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006), my sample 
confirm that the marginal value of cash is negatively associated with both the level of cash 
(-0.443) and leverage (-0.635) and that the associations are economically and statistically 
significant. These findings are consistent with the facts that firms with lower cash level 
benefit more from additional dollar as they are more severely subject to underinvestment 
problem and that debt holders receive some of the benefit associated with a dollar increase 




[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 Column (2) to Colum (4) presents the main empirical analyses. Each column 
respectively report the impact of comparability, as measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 , on the market value of cash holdings. The 
coefficients for control variables are very similar to those of Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
and Kim et al. (2015). Annual excess return is negatively related to (1) change in R&D 
expenditures, (2) change in interest expenses, (3) leverage ratio, (4) net financing, and (5) 
the interaction between leverage and change in cash; annual excess return is positively 
related to (1) earnings, (2) change in noncash asset, (3) and lagged cash holdings.  
 Consistent with the prediction, the coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  are 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that market put a premium on the value of 
cash holdings with comparable accounting information. Specifically, the magnitude (t-
value) of coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 , when comparability is measured by 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 are 0.331 (4.03), 0.272 
(3.64), and 0.339 (4.09) respectively. As comparability measures are ranked into deciles in 
my regression analyses, a useful economic interpretation follows: as a firm makes 
transition from the lowest comparability decile to the highest comparability decile, the 
market value of additional dollar in cash increases by 30 cents. The magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that the impact of comparability on the value of cash holdings is not 
only statistically significant but also economically significant. Ceteris Paribus, 
comparable firms enjoy 30% premium for additional cash on hand, compared to their non-
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comparable peers.  
 
5.2. Financial statement comparability and the value of excess cash  
Prior literature on value of cash also underscores the value of excess cash (Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith 2006; Gao and Jia 2016). It is interesting to see the value implication of 
excess cash in addition to value of cash holdings, because the free cash flow problem 
suggests that the agency problem is severe with the free cash flow: cash that is in excess 
of the level needed for operation and investment. Thus, if relation between comparability 
and the value of cash holdings is attributable to mitigation of the free cash flow problem, 
then one should expect accentuated effect with excess cash. I follow prior studies and 
define excess cash as cash reserve that is in excess of normal operation and investment 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). If comparable accounting information helps market 
participants conduct effective monitoring on the cash management of a firm, then the 
managers will, in equilibrium, hold excess cash only when there exist legitimate reasons 
(e.g., value enhancing major investment) for it. Therefore, in equilibrium, the market 
valuation of excess cash should be higher for comparable firms.  
 As prior value of cash studies suggest modified Fama and French (1998) model 
to estimate the value of excess cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2006; Gao and Jia 2016), I 
regress firm value on the level of cash and control variables that capture other sources of 
firm value:   
      
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1




























   























                 +𝛼16×
𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1




                 +𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
where for firm i in year t, 𝑑X𝑖,𝑡 indicate a change in X from year t-2 to t, 
COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡 = Financial statement comparability, measured using either 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 . 
Comparability measures are decile-ranked and normalized to range 
between [0, 1]  
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = Market value of equity, deflated by total asset net of cash (i.e., 
market-to-book ratio) as a measure of firm value   
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Asset net of cash  
Control Variable = Earnings before extraordinary items (𝐸𝑖,𝑡) from year t-1 to year t, 
R&D expenses, set to zero if missing(𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ), common dividends 
from year t-1 to year t (𝐷𝑖,𝑡), interest expense (𝐼𝑖,𝑡) from year t-1 to 
year t, and their lead and lag changes (𝑑𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝑑𝑋𝑖,𝑡+2), deflated by 
total asset net of cash (𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡)  
𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = Excess cash defined as cash minus normal cash, which is to be 
explained below 
 Here, control variables capture and control for market participants’ expectations 
about future net cash flows (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Gao and Jia 2016). 
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Specifically, (1) earnings (𝐸𝑖,𝑡) and lead and lag changes in earnings capture profitability 
and expected growth in profitability, (2) research and development expenditure (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡) and 
corresponding lead and lag changes control for expected growth in profitability stemming 
from research and development, (3) lead and lag change in asset net of cash 
(𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2 ) capture contribution of net asset to market value, (4) common 
dividend (𝐷𝑖,𝑡) and interest expense (𝐼𝑖,𝑡) and their corresponding lead and lag changes 
capture change in firms’ financing policy, and (5) future change in market value (𝑑𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡+2) 
capture other future changes of unexpected components of earnings, net assets, and other 
financial statement variables. To control for macroeconomic factors and industry factors 
that affect firm value, I also include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification.  
 Consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I estimate the regression (6) on 
all firms with positive excess cash.8 Excess cash is defined as cash in excess of normal 
operating and investing activities. Specifically, excess cash is residual from the following 
normal cash level regression, which control for genuine motives of holding cash such as 
hedging purpose, growth options, and restrictions on financing (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007): 
      𝐿𝑛 (1 +
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1








                                           
8  Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) focus on positive excess cash subgroup, because their 
hypotheses concern the effect of governance on the value and use of cash that is not needed for 
operation and investment activities  
23 
 







                       +𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where for firm i in year t,  
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Asset net of cash  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = Operating Income minus Interest minus Taxes (free cash flow) 
𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = Current Asset minus current liabilities minus cash (net working 
capital) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = Industry average of prior 3 year standard deviation of 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡/NA𝑖,𝑡 
𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = R&D expenditures, set to zero if missing  
𝑀𝑉𝑖,?̂? = Market-to-book ratio, instrumented using past three-year sales 
growth 
 I predict that the coefficients on the interaction term between De Franco et al.’s 
(2011) comparability measures and excess cash ( 𝛼18 ) are positive and statistically 
significant.9 That is, value of excess cash is higher in comparable firms.  
  Table 4 reports the regression result for equation (6). As specified, for this 
analysis, I limit my attention to firms that exhibit positive excess cash in year t. Thus, the 
sample size is reduced to 12,809 firm-year observations. Consistent with my prediction, 
                                           
9  As articulated, the comparability may reduce the debt cost of capital, which is positively 
associated with the value of cash. In such case, the coefficient (𝛼19 ) will be positive only if 
comparability mitigates the free cash flow problem and such effect is greater than the effect of 
comparability on reducing cost of debt capital. On the other hand, if comparability is not effective 
mechanism in mitigating the free cash flow problem, or if the effect is smaller than the effect of 




the coefficients of COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  are positive and statistically significant. 
Specifically, the magnitude (t-value) of coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 , when 
comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡  are 1.334 (6.54), 0.439 (2.90), and 1.380 (8.35) respectively. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are also economically significant, suggesting that 
comparability meaningfully increases the value of excess cash as well as the value of cash 
holdings.    
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3. The effect of comparability on the relation between use of excess cash and future 
profitability  
To shed light on the whether effects of comparability on the value of cash holdings and 
excess cash are due to mitigation of the free cash flow problem, I conduct additional 
analysis to examine whether financial statement comparability brings real effect in 
comparable firms.  
I argue that if comparability really induces firms to manage cash on shareholders’ 
behalf, and if the documented increase in market value of cash is due to such an efficient 
management of cash, then there should also be positive effect of comparability on 
efficiency of cash expenditure. That is, I argue that there are benefits of holding cash when 
external financing is costly, and that if comparability truly facilitates effective monitoring 
on manager’s cash management, then the cash expenditure should only occur when it is 
sufficiently beneficial to shareholders. In particular, as the agency problem is most severe 
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with the free cash flow, I suggest that the expenditure of excess cash (i.e., investment) 
should have different consequences for comparable firms and non-comparable firms.  
One particular consequence that I consider is the profitability in subsequent 
period after cash expenditure. As my definition of normal cash takes into account the 
normal and anticipated course of operation such as hedging purpose, growth options, and 
restrictions on financing, the holding and use of excess cash can be interpreted as 
unanticipated investments. If the managers efficiently use their excess cash, or conduct 
unanticipated investments efficiently, then the expenditure should bring benefits to 
shareholder in terms of improved profitability in subsequent period; otherwise it should 
have been paid back to the shareholders in a form of dividend. Thus, the effect of use of 
excess cash on future profitability provide useful setting to test whether the free cash flow 
problem has been mitigated in comparable firms.     
To investigate the efficiency of excess cash expenditure, I analyze firms that have 
excess cash in year t and use their cash from year t to year t+1. Should comparability 
mitigate the agency problem, then comparable firms would experience higher profitability 
(i.e., return on asset) in subsequent years than non-comparable peers (Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2007). Specifically, I conduct following regression analysis on sub-sample of firms 
that (1) have excess cash in year t (i.e., 𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 > 0), and (2) spend their cash (i.e., ∆C𝑖,𝑡+1< 
0) from year t to year t+1 and examine whether there exist differential consequences of 
excess cash expenditure for comparable firms and non-comparable firms.  














                      +𝛼6×
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼6×ADJ_ROA𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where for firm i in year t,  
COMPACCTi,t = Financial statement comparability, measured using either 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 . 
Comparability measures are decile-ranked and normalized to range 
between [0, 1] 
ADJ_ROA𝑖,𝑡 = Operating income before depreciation (ROA) minus industry average 
operating income before depreciation (Industry-average ROA). Fama-
French 48 Industry classification is used to estimate industry- average 
ROA. 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Asset net of cash 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1 = Change in cash from year t to year t+1.  
𝑋𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = Excess cash, defined as cash minus normal cash, where normal cash is 
defined as above 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) = Natural logarithm of total asset net of cash 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = Total property plant and equipment 
Equation (8) estimates the effect of using excess cash in year t on industry-
adjusted return on asset (ADJ_ROA𝑖,𝑡+𝑘) in year t+k. As it takes time for use of cash to 
materialize in the form of improved profitability, I investigated the effect on industry 
adjusted return on asset in year t+k (ADJ_ROA𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 ) as opposed to contemporaneous 
industry-adjusted return on asset. As I only limit my attention to those firms that (1) have 
positive excess cash in year t (i.e., 𝑋𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 > 0) and (2) spend their cash (i.e., ∆C𝑖,𝑡+1< 0), 
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a positive (negative) coefficient on 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
  represents deterioration (improvement) of 
future industry-adjusted return on asset proportional to the use of excess cash. To 
investigate the effect of comparability on the relation between use of excess cash in year t 
and future profitability, I introduce an interaction term between change in cash and 
comparability measure (i.e., COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 ). As I decile-ranked and rescaled 
comparability measures to range between [0, 1], coefficients on 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 reflect deterioration 
(improvement) of industry-adjusted return on asset in subsequent period for firms in the 




reflect differential effect of use of excess cash on industry adjusted return on asset for firms 
that are in the highest comparability decile. I expect that comparable firms are more 
efficient in their cash expenditure such that additional cash expenditure contributes more 




) than cash expenditure of non-comparable firms do to their future 
industry-adjusted return on asset. As industry adjusted ROA is likely affected by (1) current 
total asset net of cash, (2) current excess cash level, (3) current PP&E level, and (4) current 
industry adjusted ROA, I control for these variables (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007).  
Table 5 reports the regression result for equation (8). Panel A reports the effect of 




are positive and statistically significant. Since both the dependent variable and the 
independent variables are deflated by total asset net of cash, the coefficients can be 
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interpreted as an impact of spending a dollar on future industry-adjusted return on asset. 
The magnitude (t-value) of coefficients on 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 are 0.127 (7.14), 0.130 (6.81), and 0.093 
(5.39) respectively, suggesting that a dollar spent in year t is associated with deterioration 
of industry-adjusted return on asset in year t+4 by roughly 10 cents. Such phenomenon 
implies that non-comparable firms are not efficient with their excess cash management. On 
the other hand, as predicted, the coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 are negative and 




when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡  are -0.148 (-3.96), -0.128 (-3.45), and -0.060 (-1.97) respectively, 
suggesting that in comparable firms a dollar of cash expenditure contributes roughly 10 
cents more to industry-adjusted return on asset in year t+4 than a dollar of cash expenditure 
does in their non-comparable counterparts. This result suggests that unlike non-
comparable firms, comparable firms are efficient in their excess cash expenditures.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
To alleviate a concern that year t+4 is arbitrarily chosen, I investigate how the 




 when the dependent variables are industry-adjusted 
return on asset in year t, year t+1, year t+2, year t+3, year t+4, year t+5, and year t+6 
respectively. The coefficients are insignificant until year t+3, but become negative and 
29 
 
statistically significant in year t+4 and year t+5. In year t+6, the coefficients are negative 
but statistically insignificant. The result suggests that it takes time for cash expenditure to 
materialize in the form of improved industry-adjusted return on asset and the effect 
perpetuates for at least two periods in a row starting from year t+4.  
  
5.4. Comparability and capital expenditure sensitivity to cash holdings  
Previous analysis suggests that comparable firms are efficient in their cash expenditure. As 
it doesn’t specify the specific form of cash expenditure that comparable firms are efficient 
at, it is still not clear where the cash is spent and how the expenditure contributes to 
improved future profitability. To shed light on such issue, I investigate a specific form of 
investment in which cash is presumably spent in comparable firms: capital expenditure. I 
choose capital expenditure because it is one of the most important investments that a firm 
must make to maintain its operation and because prior literature suggests that different 
mechanisms that mitigate the free cash flow problem are associated with improvement in 
management of capital expenditure (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2009; Kim et al. 2015). 
 First, I investigate the relation between capital expenditure sensitivity to cash 
holdings. The free cash flow problem that Jensen (1986) suggested implies that firms 
subject to the agency problem are more prone to over-investment. That is, firms are more 
likely to spend their cash in capital expenditure that is not necessarily beneficial to 
shareholders. Thus, I predict that if comparability mitigates the free cash flow problem, 
then there should be less severe over-investment. That is, the capital expenditure sensitivity 




 To estimate the capital expenditure sensitivity to cash holdings, I follow Denis 
and Sibilkov (2010) and employ their regression model. Specifically, I regress capital 
expenditure in year t+1 on cash holdings, cash flow from operation, market-to-book ratio, 
and sales growth. To address potential endogeneity with respect to the level of cash 
holdings, I use the two-staged-least squares (2SLS) methodology11. Since comparability 










 suggest the difference in sensitivity between firms in the lowest 
comparability decile and firms in the highest comparability decile. The details on the 
regression specification are summarized below: 
                                           
10 This prediction should only hold when capital expenditure opportunities that the firm face are 
over-investments (i.e., not sufficiently profitable). If not, the reverse should be true. For example, 
Kim et al. (2015) suggest that higher capital expenditure sensitivity to cash holding is a good signal 
and argue that if higher-quality auditors provide better information for the oversight of capital 
investments, then capital expenditure should be more closely associated with cash holdings in firms 
with higher-quality auditors. To argue that the higher sensitivity is beneficial to shareholder, Kim et 
al. (2015) check whether the investment is indeed value-enhancing for shareholders and not an 
overinvestment. My findings also suggest that comparability increases the capital expenditure 
sensitivity to cash holdings and that such capital expenditure is value-enhancing, mitigating the 
concern that comparable firms are over-investing.  
11 Following Kim et al. (2015) in the first stage I estimate the following modified Oper et al. (1999) 
model: ln(1 + 𝐶𝑖,𝑡/𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) = α0 + α1×𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + α2×𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + α3×𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + α5×
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + α6×𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of total asset; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
is total debt over sum of total debt and market value of equity; 𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is net working capital to 
total asset net of cash; 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡; 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is dividend to total asset net of cash. Opler et al. (1999) 
suggest that operating cash flow, market to book value, and capital expenditure are associated with 
cash-holdings, but as the variables are included in my main regression model as independent or 
dependent variables I exclude them.   
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡












                     +𝛼4×𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(8) 
where for firm i in year t,  
COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡 = Financial statement comparability, measured using either 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡. 
Comparability measures are decile-ranked and normalized to range 
between [0, 1] 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  Asset net of cash 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = Capital expenditure. For firms that do not report capital expenditure, I 
assumed it to be zero. 
𝐶𝑖,?̂? = Estimated cash and cash equivalent from modified Opler et al. (1999) 
model.   
𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = Operating cash flow  
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = Market value of equity in year t deflated by book value of equity in 
year t-1. 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = The percentage change in gross sales from year t-1 to year the year t. 
 Table 6 presents the regression result for the impact of comparability on capital 
expenditure sensitivity to cash holdings. Column (1), Column (2), and Column (3) report 
the effect of comparability as measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖𝑡, 
and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖𝑡 respectively. Consistent with Denis and Sibilkov (2010) and Kim et al. 









 are positive and statistically significant. Specifically, 
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 when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 are 0.046 
(3.50), 0.056 (9.85), and 0.049 (9.71) respectively. The results suggest that comparable 
firms spend their cash more in capital expenditure than their non-comparable counterparts. 
This is contrary to my expectation; thus I conduct additional analysis in next section to 
examine the phenomenon more thoroughly.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5.5. Financial statement comparability and the market value of capital expenditure 
To further investigate whether comparable firms engage in over-investment, I conduct 
another analysis to see whether capital expenditure that comparable firms undertake is, 
indeed, over-investment (i.e., value-decreasing investment). Perhaps, the reason that 
comparable firms have higher sensitivity to cash holdings is because the capital 
expenditure that comparable firms undertake is more value-enhancing than that of non-
comparable firms. In such case, the capital expenditure is not an over-investment but a 
legitimate investment that benefits shareholders.   
 For the purpose, following Masulis et al. (1999) and Kim et al. (2015), I estimate 
the market value of capital expenditure with modified Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) 
regression model. Specifically, I regress annual excess return on change in capital 
expenditure and other control variables. As small change in capital expenditure may reflect 
change in maintenance costs as opposed to capital investment, I focus on firms that have 
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at least 5 percentage increase in capital expenditure, consistent with prior studies (Masulis 
et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2015). Once again comparability measures are decile-ranked and 
rescaled to range between [0, 1]. The details on the regression model are summarized 
below:    
       𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡























               +𝛼9×
𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1




               +𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(9) 
where for firm i in year t,  
COMPACCTi,t = Financial statement comparability, measured using either 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 . 
Comparability measures are decile-ranked and normalized to range 
between [0, 1] 
Control Variable = Change in capital expenditure (∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ), change in earnings 
(∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡), change in total asset net of cash (∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡), change in R&D 
expenditure (∆𝑅𝐷) , change in interest expense (∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡) , change in 
common dividend (∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ), capital expenditure at the end of the 
previous year (∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) and new finance from year t-1 to year 
t (𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡), all deflated by market value of firm at year t-1 (𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1) 
except for leverage  
ri,t - Ri,t
B   = Annual excess return measured over 12-month period ending three 
months after the fiscal year-end minus benchmark portfolio return 
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during the same period. The benchmark portfolio return is 
measured by the equally weighted average return of Fama and 
French’s (1993) 25 size and book-to-market portfolio  
 Table 7 presents the regression result for the effect of comparability on the market 
value of capital expenditure. The coefficients on 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 are negative and statistically 
insignificant across all columns, consistent with prior studies (Kim et al. 2015). The result 
suggest that capital expenditure is not necessarily value-enhancing for firms in the lowest 
comparability decile. However, the coefficient on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 are positive 
and statistically significant, implying that capital expenditure in comparable firms are 




,  when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 are 0.268 (1.73), 0.334 (2.35), and 0.474 (2.78) 
respectively. Although the magnitude and t-value are slightly lower when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , the regression results suggest that comparability 
increases the market value of capital expenditure in general. This implies that comparable 
firms are managing their capital expenditure efficiently. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
  
 The result for market value of capital expenditure implies that high capital 
expenditure sensitivity in comparable firms is not evidence of over-investment. High 
sensitivity in comparable firms should be the case as comparable firms are more efficient 
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in their capital expenditure such that the expenditure is more value-increasing for 
shareholder. Therefore, jointly, the results in this section and previous section imply that 
comparable firms are more efficient with capital expenditure and that the higher market 
value of cash in comparable firms may be manifestation of market expectation that the 
cash in comparable firms will be efficiently used in capital expenditure.    
 
5.6. Comparability and the value of cash holdings during financial crisis period and 
non-financial crisis period 
The next analysis is designed to investigate whether the effect of comparability differs 
considerably during financial crisis period and non-financial crisis period. Prior studies 
suggest that during 2008-2009 financial crisis, firms’ credit lines were heavily undermined 
and that liquidity became scarce (Campello et al. 2010; Campello et al. 2011). 
Consequently, underinvestment problem, a problem that firms with positive net present 
value investment opportunity fail to undertake the investment due to lack of capital, 
became more critical among firms, and cash become more valuable to firms (Campello et 
al. 2011). 12  Therefore, it is an empirically important question whether the effect of 
comparability on the value of cash holdings remains (or accentuates) when cash is the most 
needed. 
 There are reasons to expect that this is, in fact, the case, and that the effect actually 
                                           
12 Kim et al. (2015) suggest that the opposite may be true. During financial crisis, investment 
opportunities are limited due to the economic recession, thus, the value of liquid asset decreases as 
the value of investment decreases. However, they document that the value of cash increases during 
financial crisis period (i.e., 2006-2008). My finding is consistent with Kim et al. (2015)   
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accentuates during financial crisis period. Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012), investigating in 
international setting, document that transparency (as measured by less evidence of earnings 
management, better accounting standard, higher quality auditors, more analyst following, 
and more accurate analysts’ forecasts) is negatively associated with transaction costs and 
positively associated with liquidity and that transparency matters more during times of 
greater investor uncertainty. Similarly, Francis, Hasan, Wu (2013) document that 
accounting conservatism positively affect firm value during 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Presuming that comparability contribute to market participants’ decision making in a 
similar fashion to transparency and accounting conservatism, I expect that the relation 
between comparability and the value of cash holdings should accentuate during financial 
crisis. To investigate differential effects of comparability on value of cash holdings during 
crisis and non-crisis period, I estimated the modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) 
regression model (i.e., equation (5)) separately for crisis period (i.e., 2008 -2009) and non-
crisis period (i.e., 1990 – 2007 and 2010-2013).  
 Table 8 presents the regression results; each column reports the coefficient on the 
variables of interest (i.e., 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  and COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 ) when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 
respectively. The coefficient on 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 is bigger during non-crisis period than during crisis 
period. Specifically, when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 , the coefficients on 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  during non-crisis 
(crisis) period are 0.900 (0.357), 0.922 (0.460), and 0.854 (0.535) respectively. The 
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difference on the coefficient between crisis period and non-crisis period are statistically 
significant; t-value of the differences are -3.08, -2.59, and -1.74 when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,  and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 
respectively. Note the statistical significance is slightly low when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡, but in general coefficients are statistically significant. The 
magnitude is also economically significant. During crisis period, the value of a dollar in 
the lowest comparability decile is reduced to less that the half of that expected during non-
crisis period when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡  and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 . When comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖𝑡, the value of 
cash for firms in the lowest decile during financial crisis period is roughly half of that 
expected during non-financial crisis. The results imply that despite relative scarceness of 
liquid asset during financial crisis period, firms in the lowest comparability decile suffer 
greater discount for additional dollar on hand during crisis period than during non-crisis 
period. This suggest that due to underlying uncertainty, market participants are more 
cautious about the free cash problem. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
 The difference in the coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  help understand 




,  the coefficient on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  is bigger during crisis 






 . Specifically, when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,




during non-crisis (crisis) period are 0.214 (1.415), 0.180 (1.187), and 0.318 (0.833) 
respectively. The difference on the coefficient between crisis period and non-crisis period 
are statistically significant; t-value of the differences are 4.66, 3.99, and 1.95 when 
comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡  respectively. Although the statistical significance is slightly low when 
comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡, this is consistent with slightly low statistical 
significance on the penalty that non-comparable firms suffer during crisis period when 
comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 . The magnitudes are economically 
significant as well. The coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 are more than 6 times larger 
during financial crisis when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and the coefficient is more than twice larger during crisis period 
than during non-crisis period. The results suggest that the value of cash for firms in the 
highest comparability decile is higher during financial crisis than non-financial crisis. 
When comparability is measured by  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖𝑡 , the values of additional cash in the highest comparability decile are 1.114 
(=0.900+0.214), 1.102 (=0.922+0.180), and 1.172 (=0.854+0.318) respectively during 
non-financial crisis while the values are 1.772 (=0.357+1.415), 1.647(=0.460+1.187), and 
1.368 (=0.535+0.833) respectively during financial crisis period. This is consistent with 
the fact that liquid asset is scarce during financial crisis and that as a result cash is more 
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valuable to the firm as it mitigates the underinvestment problem.  
 In sum, the result suggests that comparability contributes more to the firm value 
during financial crisis than during non-financial crisis. Firms in highest comparability 
decile enjoy greater premium for additional dollar on hand during crisis period than during 
non-crisis period, while firms in the lowest comparability decile suffer greater penalty. 
This is presumably because the underlying economy is more uncertain during financial 
crisis period such that market participants are more cautious about the free cash flow 
problem (Francis et al. 2013) and because the liquid asset is scarce during financial crisis 
period such that so long as shareholders are assured that the cash will be used for their own 
benefit, they will put more value to additional dollar that firms hold. (Campello et al. 2010; 
Campello et al. 2011)   
 
5.7. Controlling for strength of corporate governance 
In this section, I investigate whether the result I have documented is robust to strength of 
corporate governance. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) document that corporate 
governance affects the value of cash holdings. In particular, they argue that investor 
oversight by large institutional shareholders and managerial entrenchment resulting from 
antitakeover provisions are closely associated with the value of cash holdings. The higher 
the investor oversight and the lower the managerial entrenchment, the higher the value of 
additional dollar. Although comparability and strength of corporate governance are 
conceptually different, it would be safe to test whether two effects are robust to one another. 
To address the issue, I employ Dittmar hand Mahrt-Smith’s (2007) methodology and 
conduct additional analysis. Specifically, I introduce the G-Index (Gompers et al. 2003), 
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an index that measures the number of antitakeover provisions in firms’ charter and in the 
legal code, to the modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) regression model13. Following 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I convert the G-Index into a dummy variable by forming 
a tercile, deleting the middle tercile, and normalizing it to range between [0, 1]. Specifically, 
the 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is defined to be 1 if a firm’s G-Index is in the lowest tercile and 0 if a firm’s 
G-Index is in the highest tercile in each fiscal year. As I restrict my sample to have 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 
in this analysis, the sample size is reduced to 7,941 firm-year observation over the period 
of 1990 – 200614.  
 Table 9, Panel A reports the result of the regression analysis. Column (1) presents 




 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
smaller the number of antitakeover provision, the higher the market value of cash holdings. 
Column (2) through Column (4) present the regression result when comparability is 
measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 




,  when comparability is measured by the 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡,




 are still statistically and economically significant. 
                                           
13 Professor Metrick discloses the index publicly, and the index is downloadable from his 
homepage. 
14 The sample period is reduced to 1990 – 2006 from 1990 – 2013 as the G-Index is only 
available until 2006.  
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The coefficients on 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 are also statistically and economically significant, even 













 into the regression model. The result implies that the effect of 
comparability and strength of corporate governance on the value of cash holdings are 
robust to one another.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 To shed light on the relation among the strength of corporate governance, 
comparability, and the value of cash holdings, in Panel B, I separately estimate the 
modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) regression model with in the lowest and the highest 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 decile. That is, I investigate whether the impact of comparability on the value of 
cash holdings has differential effect conditioning on the degree of managerial 
entrenchment. The table reports the coefficient on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
, the variable of 
my interest. The result suggests that the coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  are 
statistically and economically significant when the corporate governance is strong (i.e., the 
managerial entrenchment is low), while the coefficients are not statistically significant 
when the corporate governance is weak (i.e., the managerial entrenchment is high). 
Specifically, when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,






 are 0.792 (3.14), 0.580 (2.54), and 0.562 (2.23) respectively, if the 
corporate governance is strong, but the magnitude (t-value) of the coefficients aare only 
0.368 (1.29), 0.339 (1.20), and 0.278 (1.01) respectively, if the corporate governance is 
weak. The result implies that although comparability enables market participants to 
scrutinize the managerial cash management, inducing managers to be more efficient with 
their cash holdings, the mechanism is more effective when the managers are less 
entrenched (i.e., there are effective means to penalize managers who do not use cash 
efficiently on shareholder’s behalf). This is consistent with the argument that accounting 
information constitutes a building block in corporate governance of a firm by being an 
input to existing governance mechanisms (Bushman and Smith 2001). To elaborate, 
accounting information provides accurate information on managers’ behavior; different 
overseeing entities, equipped with the information, direct managers to behave for the 
benefits of shareholders.  
 
5.8. Controlling for other financial reporting quality measures  
In this section, I test whether the effect of comparability on the value of cash holdings is 
robust to other financial reporting qualities. De Franco et al. (2011) suggest that 
comparability measures are closely associated with other financial reporting quality 
measures. Since prior studies suggest that other financial reporting qualities are associated 
with the market value of cash (Louis et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2012), it should be verified 
whether the documented effect is not a manifestation of the effect of other financial 
reporting qualities. For the purpose, I control for accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
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McNichols 2002) and accounting conservatism (Hayn and Givoly 2000).15 I specifically 
examine the aforementioned financial reporting qualities because prior studies suggest that 
they are associated with the value of cash holdings. Sun et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2015) 
suggest that financial reporting quality is positively associated with the value of cash 
holdings and Louis et al. (2012) document that accounting conservatism is positively 
associated with the value of cash holdings. Following Sun et al. (2012) and Louis et al. 
(2012), I measure firm-level accrual quality by modified Dechow and Dichev (Dechow 
and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002) and firm-level conservatism by accounting 
conservatism measure developed in Hayn and Givoly (2000). To facilitate interpretation 
and to be consistent with adjustment on comparability measures, I decile-ranked each 
financial reporting qualities within each year and normalized so that the measure range 
between [0, 1]. See the appendix for details of variable definition.  
 Table 10 reports the regression result about the effect of comparability on the 
value of cash holdings after controlling for accrual quality. In Table 10 column (1), I 
provide a replication of prior study as a benchmark. Consistent with Sun et al. (2012) and 
Kim et al. (2015), the accrual quality is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. 
Specifically, the magnitude (t-value) of the coefficient on 𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 is 0.211 (2.65), 
suggesting that a transition from the lowest comparability decile to the highest 
comparability decile increases the value of additional dollar by 21.1 cents. Column (2) 
                                           
15 There are other measures of accounting conservatism (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
However, Louis et al. (2012) suggest that for value of cash studies Givoly and Hayn (2000) is the 
most suitable. I, thus, use Givoly and Hayn (2000) in this section.   
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through Column (5) report the regression results about the effect of comparability on the 
value of cash holdings controlling for accrual quality. Each column presents the regression 
result when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,




 are still positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
effect of comparability on the value of cash holdings is robust to accrual quality. 




comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 are 0.307 (3.53), 0.252 (3.01), and 0.368 (3.98) respectively. On the other 
hand, the coefficients on 𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
 have declined both in magnitude and t-value, albeit 
slightly. The results suggest comparability is distinctly important in mitigating the free 
cash flow problem and hence in increasing the value of cash holdings.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
 Table 11 reports the regression result about the effect of comparability on the 
value of cash holdings after controlling for accounting conservatism. In Table 11 column 
(1), I provide a replication of prior study as a benchmark. Consistent with Louis et al. 
(2012), the impact of accounting conservatism on the value of cash holdings is positive 




 is 0.191 (2.01), suggesting that a transition from the 
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lowest comparability decile to the highest comparability decile increases the value of 
additional dollar by 19.1 cents. Column (2) through Column (5) report the regression 
results about the effect of comparability on the value of cash holdings controlling for 
accounting conservatism. Each column presents the regression result when comparability 
is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡, and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 
respectively. The coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  are positive and statistically 
significant. In fact, the magnitudes and t-values of the coefficients have increased slightly, 
suggesting that the effect of comparability on the value of cash holdings is robust to 




  when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 are 0.464 (4.12), 0.400 (3.66), and 0.470 (4.03) 




  have increased when comparability is measured by 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 or 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 . But the  magnitude and t-value have 
declined when comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 , albeit slightly. The result 
confirms that comparability is distinct from accounting conservatism and that both 
comparability and accounting conservatism serves roles in mitigating the free cash flow 
problem.  
 




5.9. Alternative measures for financial statement comparability and the value of cash 
holdings 
In this section, I test whether my findings are robust to alternative measures of 
comparability. The De Franco et al.’s (2011) measures implicitly assume a linear relation 
between underlying economic event and accounting numbers. However, prior studies 
suggest that the relation between the return (i.e., the proxy for economic event), and 
earnings (i.e., the proxy for accounting numbers) is not linear but piece-wise linear 
conditional on whether the return is positive or negative (e.g., Basu 1997). To address this 
concern, I modify the underlying premise about the accounting mapping to accommodate 
such piece-wise linearity and compute the firm specific accounting mapping as Barth et al. 
(2012) and Kim et al. (2016) suggest. Specifically, I estimate the following time-series 
regression model using 16-quarter of data:  










         +𝛼4×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡×
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(10) 
where for firm i in quarter t,  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡  Quarterly stock return 
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = Quarterly net income before extraordinary item 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Stock price at the end of the period 
𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = Dummy variable that equals 1 if Ei,t is negative and 0 otherwise 
I follow the prior algorithm to estimate firm-level comparability measures: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡.  
 Table 12, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the alternative measure of 
47 
 
comparability put forth by Barth et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2016). Consistent with De 
Franco et al.’s (2011) measure, the Barth et al. (2012) measure is skewed to the left as 
median is bigger than the mean. The relative size of comparability measures (i.e., size of 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 , and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡  with respect to one 
another) are consistent with De Franco et al. (2011). To accommodate such non-linearity 
and to facilitate economic interpretation, I decile-ranked comparability measures within 
each fiscal year and normalized to range between [0, 1]. 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
 Table 12, Panel B presents regression results. For the sake of brevity, I only report 
the variables of interest, as the control variables are fairly consistent with prior analyses. 
The coefficients on COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  are positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that the relation between comparability and the value of cash holdings is not 
specific to De Franco et al.’s (2011) comparability measures. In fact, the results suggest 
that the impact of comparability on the value of cash holdings is higher when alternative 
accounting mapping is assumed and comparability is measured by 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡. 
 Second, I employ another alternative comparability measure put forth by Choi et 
al. (2017). De Franco et al. (2011) uses stock return in the first stage to estimate firm 
specific accounting mapping. As my main regression model employs adjusted stock return 
as dependent variable, there may be concern over the specification (i.e., simultaneous 
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equation bias). To address this issue, I estimate the firm specific accounting mapping 
without resorting to return data. Specifically, following Choi et al. (2017), I estimate the 
following time-series regression model using 16-quarter of data: 
         
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1





where for firm i in quarter t,  
𝐸𝑖,𝑡  Quarterly net income before extraordinary item 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = Market value of equity at the end of the period 
𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = Quarterly operating cash flow  
I follow the prior algorithm to estimate firm-level comparability measures: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡.  
 Table 13, Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the alternative 
comparability measures. Unlike the measure put forth by Barth et al. (2012), the Choi et 
al. (2017) measures have similar distribution to De Franco et al.’s (2011) measure even in 
magnitude. Once again to accommodate non-linearity and to facilitate economic 
interpretation, I decile-rank comparability measures within each fiscal year and normalized 
to range between [0, 1]: 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡,and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡.  
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 
 Table 13, Panel B presents results for the regression analyses. Consistent with 
prior analyses, the coefficients  COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
  are positive and statistically 
significant. Although the adjusted R2 from the regression models are slightly higher than 
49 
 
my main regression, the tenor of the results remain identical, suggesting that the 
simultaneous equation bias is not confounding the regression results.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I examine whether financial statement comparability affects the market 
valuation of cash holdings. Based on a large sample U.S. firms, I document that 
comparability is positively associated with the value of cash holdings and excess cash. 
Specifically, a transition from the lowest comparability decile to the highest comparability 
decile is associated with about 30 cents premium for every dollar that firm holds. I attribute 
such increase in the value of cash to the mitigation of the free cash flow problem (Jensen 
1986). Consistent with the argument, I document (1) that comparable firms that spend their 
excess cash exhibit higher future industry adjusted return on asset than their non-
comparable counterparts that do so, (2) comparable firms shows higher capital expenditure 
sensitivity to cash holdings than non-comparable peers, and (3) that such capital 
expenditure is indeed value-enhancing. The results suggest that comparable firms are more 
efficient in their cash management. I argue that this is the case, because, with comparable 
accounting information, shareholders can make better inference about cash management 
of a firm, and such scrutiny will induce managers to deviate from seeking their own self-
interest. To corroborate the argument, I document (1) that the effect of comparability on 
the value of cash holdings accentuate during financial crisis period, suggesting that 
comparability beneficial when liquidity is the most needed, (2) that the effect is robust to 
strength of corporate governance and becomes stronger in strong corporate governance, (3) 
that the effect is robust to other financial reporting qualities (i.e., accrual quality and 
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accounting conservatism), and (4) that the effect is robust to alternative comparability 
measures (i.e., Barth et al. (2012) measure and Choi et al. (2017) measure).  
 I acknowledge that my study is subject to potential limitation such as 
measurement errors and that such limitations make it difficult to argue for causality. 
Despite such issues, I suggest that my finding implies an important merit of having 
comparable accounting information. That is, it reduces the agency problem as it reveals 
information about the managerial behavior. I suggest that regulation setter and policy 
makers can gain useful insight from my study, as my study provides another point to 
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APPENDIX: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
Variable  Definition Data Source 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the mean of the negative value 
of the average absolute difference between the 
expected earnings using firm i’s and j’s 










𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡  The median 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡  for all firm i’s 
industry peers in year t, ranked into decile 
within each fiscal year and rescaled to range 
between [0, 1]  
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡  The mean 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡  for all firm i’s 
industry peers in year t, ranked into decile 
within each fiscal year and rescaled to range 
between [0, 1] 
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡  The mean 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 for 4 firms that have 
the highest  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡 in firm i’s industry in 
year t, ranked into decile within each fiscal 
year and rescaled to range between [0, 1] 
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡  Market value at time t, price times shares 




B   Annual excess return measured over 12-month 
period ending three months after the fiscal 
year-end minus benchmark portfolio return 
during the same period. The benchmark 
portfolio return is measured by the equally 
weighted average return of Fama and French’s 




  Operating income before depreciation deflated 
by total asset net of cash (ROA) in year t minus 
industry average operating income before 
depreciation deflated by total asset net of cash 
(Industry-average ROA) in year t. Fama-
French 48 Industry classification is used to 
estimate industry- average ROA.   
COMPUSTAT 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄   Capital expenditure deflated by total asset net 
of cash in year t. For firms that do not report 






Variable  Definition Data Source 
     Control Variables 
∆Ci,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in cash and cash equivalent from year 
t-1 to year t, deflated by the market value of 
equity in year t-1  
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
∆Ei,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in earnings before extraordinary item 
from year t-1 to year t, deflated by the market 
value of equity in year t-1 
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
∆NAi,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in total asset net of cash and cash 
equivalent from year t-1 to year t, deflated by 
the market value of equity in year t-1 
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
∆RDi,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in R&D expenditure from year t-1 to 




∆Ii,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in interest expense from year t-1 to 




∆Di,t Mi,t-1⁄   Change in common dividend from year t-1 to 




Li,t  Debti,t/(Debti,t + Mi,t) 
Debti,t = Long term debt plus short term debt in 
year t 
Mi,t = Market value of equity in year t  
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
NFi,t/Mi,t-1  Net new equity issue in year t plus net new debt 
issues in year t, deflated by market value of 
equity in year t. 
CRSP/ 
COMPUSTAT 
Ei,t NAi,t-1⁄   Earnings before extraordinary item from year 
t-1 to year t, deflated by total asset net of cash 
in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Ei,t NAi,t-1⁄   Change in Earnings before extraordinary item 
from year t-2 to t, deflated by total asset net of 
cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Ei,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Change in Earnings before extraordinary item 
from year t to t+2, deflated by total asset net of 
cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
RDi,t NAi,t-1⁄   R&D expenditure in year t, deflated by total 
asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑RDi,t NAi,t-1⁄   Change in R&D expenditure from year t-2 to t, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑RDi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Change in R&D expenditure from year t to t+2, 








Variable  Definition Data Source 
Di,t NAi,t-1⁄   Dividend in year t, deflated by total asset net of 
cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Di,t NAi,t-1⁄   Change in Dividend from year t-2 to year t, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Di,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Change in Dividend from year t to year t+2, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
Ii,t NAi,t-1⁄   Interest expense in year t, deflated by total 
asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Ii,t NAi,t-1⁄   Interest expense from year t-2 to year t, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑Ii,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Interest expense from year t to year t+2, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑NAi,t NAi,t-1⁄   Change in total asset net of cash from year t-2 
to year t, deflated by total asset net of cash in 
year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑NAi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Change in total asset net of cash from year t to 
year t+2, deflated by total asset net of cash in 
year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑑MVi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄   Change in market value from year t to year t+2, 
deflated by total asset net of cash in year t-1 
COMPUSTAT 
Ln(NA𝑖,𝑡)  Natural logarithm of total asset net of cash in 
year t. 
COMPUSTAT 
PPEi,t NAi,t-1⁄   Gross property, plant, and equipment deflated by 
asset net of cash in year t  
COMPUSTAT 
𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄   Operating cash flow deflated by total asset net of 
cash in year t 
COMPUSTAT 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡  Market value of equity deflated by book value of 
equity in year t 
COMPUSTAT 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  The percentage change in gross sales from year t-1 
to year t 
COMPUSTAT 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡  Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index 
from 1990 to 2006, which measures the number of 
antitakeover provision in a firm’s charter and in the 
legal code of the state in which the firm is 
incorporated. For the years that the data for 
corporate governance index is not reported, I have 
assumed the index to be equivalent to the that of 
previous year. I constructed a dummy variable by 
first forming tercile and second deleting the second 
tercile group. To facilitate economic interpretation, 
I adjusted the measure so that the higher index (i.e., 







Variable  Definition Data Source 
𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡  Modified Accrual Quality measure 
(McNichols 2002) in year t. Specifically, it is 
standard deviation of residual over years t-2 
through t from following specification: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α0+α0𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 






𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡: Total current accrual in year t 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡: Average asset from year t-1 to year t 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡: Cash flow from operation in year t 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡: Change in revenue from year t-1 to      
       year t 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡: Gross value of PPE in year t 
The raw variable is decile-ranked within each 
fiscal year and normalized so that it ranges 
between [0, 1]. 
COMPUSTAT 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡  Following Givoly and Hayn (2000), the 
negative of the ratio of non-operating accruals 
to total assets cumulated over the previous 
three years. Nonoperating accruals are defined 
as net income plus depreciation minus cash 
flow from operations minus changes in 
accounts receivable minus change in 
inventories minus change in prepaid expenses 
plus change in accounts payable plus change in 
tax payable. The raw variable is decile-ranked 
within each fiscal year and normalized so that 





Table 1. Descriptive statistics and sample distribution 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Note: Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical analyses. The 
sample is comprised of 34,211 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013 except for 
accrual quality measure, conservatism measure, and governance measure, which are comprised of 
33,398, 18,205, and 11,905 firm-year observation over the period of 1990-2013 respectively. All 




Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Q1 Median Q3 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 37,995 -2.734 2.957 -3.044 -1.764 -1.153 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 37,995 -3.508 2.698 -4.023 -2.812 -2.045 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 37,995 -0.741 1.520 -0.696 -0.275 -0.125 
ri,t 37,995 0.191 0.829 -0.204 0.070 0.368 
ri,t - Ri,t
B  37,995 0.009 0.579 -0.317 -0.072 0.192 
∆Ci,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.009 0.127 -0.025 0.002 0.035 
∆Ei,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.014 0.200 -0.031 0.006 0.039 
∆NAi,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.057 0.390 -0.033 0.036 0.140 
∆RDi,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.000 0.022 0 0 0.002 
∆Ii,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.001 0.020 -0.002 0 0.003 
∆Di,t Mi,t-1⁄  37,995 0.000 0.009 0 0 0.004 
Li,t 37,995 0.237 0.225 0.037 0.180 0.379 
NFi,t/Mi,t-1 37,995 0.030 0.203 -0.034 0.001 0.060 
𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 33,398 0.044 0.056 0.016 0.029 0.052 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑖,𝑡 18,205 0.023 0.094 -0.001 0.017 0.040 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 11,905 9.270 2.718 7.000 9.000 11.000 
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Panel B: Sample distribution across fiscal year 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
N 1,394 1,541 1,601 1,617 1,628 1,638 1,703 1,707 1,725 1,673 1,598 1,618 
% 3.67 4.06 4.21 4.26 4.28 4.31 4.48 4.49 4.54 4.40 4.21 4.26 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
N 1,611 1,626 1,624 1,656 1,621 1,546 1,473 1,481 1,496 1,512 1,504 1,402 
% 4.24 4.28 4.27 4.36 4.27 4.07 3.88 3.90 3.94 3.98 3.96 3.69 






Table 2. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 

















































































































































































































































Note: This table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of main variables. The sample is comprised of 37,995 firm-year 
observations over the period of 1990-2013. The numbers reported in the parenthesis are p-values 
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Table 3. The effect of financial statement comparability on the value of cash 
holdings:  
 
Dependent Variable = Annual excess return (ri,t - Ri,t
B ) 
(1)Benchmark (2)CompAcctIndmed (3)CompAcctIndavg (4)CompAcct4 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 1.001*** 22.95 0.855*** 15.62 0.875*** 16.01 0.835*** 14.44 
∆𝑬𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.396*** 29.20 0.400*** 29.82 0.397*** 29.58 0.399*** 29.59 
∆𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.201*** 25.72 0.181*** 23.69 0.189*** 24.44 0.187*** 24.46 
∆𝐑𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.210* 1.84 0.206* 1.78 0.186 1.61 0.176 1.53 
∆𝐈𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.757*** -5.62 -0.791*** -5.88 -0.788*** -5.87 -0.825*** -6.11 
∆𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.961*** 4.32 1.092*** 4.99 1.097*** 5.00 1.024*** 4.70 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.109*** 10.08 0.143*** 12.86 0.131*** 11.84 0.137*** 12.34 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.285*** -27.19 -0.242*** -22.88 -0.255*** -24.16 -0.246*** -23.13 
𝐍𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.232*** -15.47 -0.200*** -13.48 -0.213*** -14.26 -0.211*** -14.19 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.443*** -7.93 -0.338*** -5.70 -0.345*** -5.81 -0.330*** -5.55 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.635*** -7.14 -0.640*** -7.18 -0.656*** -7.35 -0.575*** -6.38 
COMPACCTi,t   0.139*** 18.05 0.110*** 13.98 0.109*** 14.90 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏   0.311*** 4.03 0.272*** 3.64 0.339*** 4.09 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37,995 37,995 37,995 37,995 
Adj. R2 0.181 0.183 0.179 0.180 
Note: This table shows the regression results of hypothesis 1 using the Faulkender and Wang (2005) 
specification, investigating the effect of financial statement comparability on the value of cash 
holdings. The sample is comprised of 37,995 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. 
All the continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom one-percentile. Comparability 
measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To 
adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. See Appendix for other variable 
definition. The variable of interest is bolded and shaded 
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Table 4. The effect of financial statement comparability on the value of excess cash 
using modified Fama and French (1998) Specification  






 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Ei,t NAi,t-1⁄  1.739*** 20.77 0.956*** 11.45 1.599*** 22.15 0.727*** 9.09 
𝒅Ei,t NAi,t-1⁄  0.088 1.94 0.250*** 5.06 0.181*** 3.93 0.345*** 6.69 
𝒅Ei,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  -0.658*** -13.74 -0.365*** -7.94 -0.668*** -14.65 -0.381*** -8.29 
RDi,t NAi,t-1⁄  4.371*** 43.40 4.747*** 40.90 4.259*** 48.27 4.552*** 40.22 
𝒅RDi,t NAi,t-1⁄  0.608*** 5.07 0.839*** 5.66 0.631*** 5.40 0.422*** 2.81 
𝒅RDi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  -3.426*** -36.90 -2.611*** -23.29 -3.430*** -36.43 -2.479*** -24.50 
Di,t NAi,t-1⁄  8.422*** 12.31 7.379*** 10.29 7.351*** 15.26 6.681*** 9.45 
𝒅Di,t NAi,t-1⁄  1.282 1.11 2.277* 1.93 1.806* 1.90 2.284** 2.04 
𝒅Di,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  -6.798*** -9.43 -6.493*** -8.65 -6.341*** -9.72 -5.871*** -8.20 
Ii,t NAi,t-1⁄  -1.371** -2.19 0.010 0.02 -0.370 -0.77 0.801 1.32 
𝒅Ii,t NAi,t-1⁄  -0.344 -0.54 -1.968*** -3.18 -0.986* -1.75 -2.078*** -3.42 
𝒅Ii,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  3.116*** 6.39 4.450*** 8.72 2.990*** 6.32 4.507*** 9.33 
𝒅NAi,t NAi,t-1⁄  1.371*** 43.34 1.374*** 43.78 1.352*** 43.17 1.369*** 43.03 
𝒅NAi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  -0.382*** -18.92 -0.432*** -21.17 -0.373*** -19.63 -0.455*** -22.59 
𝒅MVi,t+2 NAi,t-1⁄  0.013*** 2.73 -0.028*** -5.87 0.010** 2.18 -0.019*** -3.96 
XCi,t NAi,t-1⁄  1.667*** 30.86 1.045*** 11.57 1.506*** 18.92 0.974*** 10.50 
COMPACCTi,t   0.328*** 7.27 0.307*** 9.26 0.549*** 10.51 
COMPACCTi,t× XCi,t NAi,t-1⁄   1.344*** 6.54 0.439*** 2.90 1.380*** 8.35 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,809 12,809 12,809 12,809 
Adj. R2 0.845 0.867 0.847 0.866 
Note: This table shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability 
on the value of excess cash using the Fama and French (1998) specification. Consistent with Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I restrict the sample to firms that have excess cash in year t. The sample 
is comprised of 34,211 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous 
variables are winsorized at top and bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into 
deciles within each fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, 
standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, 
and a 0.01 level respectively. See Appendix for other variable definition. The variable of interest is 
bolded and shaded. 
64 
 
Table 5. Financial statement comparability and the relation between the use of cash 
on subsequent operating performance  
 
Panel A.  
  Dependent Variable = Industry adjusted ROA(= ADJ_ROAi,t+4 ) 
  (1) CompAcctIndavg  (2)CompAcctIndavg  (3) CompAcct4 
Variable  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
𝜟𝑪𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕⁄   0.127***  7.14  0.130***  6.81  0.093***  5.39 
𝑿𝑪𝒊,𝒕/𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.001  0.37  -0.001  -0.17  -0.005  -1.58 
COMPACCTi,t  0.000  0.71  0.001*  1.65  0.032***  5.15 
COMPACCTi,t×𝜟𝑪𝒊,𝒕+𝟏/𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕  -0.148***  -3.96  -0.128***  -3.45  -0.060**  -1.97 
𝐋𝐧(𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕)  0.004***  4.37  0.004***  4.13  0.004***  4.07 
𝐏𝐏𝐄𝒊,𝒕/𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕  0.018***  3.80  0.017***  3.69  0.019***  4.05 
𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐚𝐝𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝐎𝐀𝒊,𝒕  0.410***  48.03  0.411***  49.73  0.365***  44.19 
Year & industry fixed 
effect 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5,775  5,775  5,775 





Panel B.  
  Independent Variable (=COMPACCTi,t×𝜟𝑪𝒊,𝒕+𝟏/𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕) 
  (1) CompAcctIndavg  (2)CompAcctIndavg  (3)CompAcct4 
Dependent Variable  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
ADJ_ROA
t+1
  0.061***  2.52  0.052  2.20  -0.001  -0.08 
ADJ_ROA
t+2
  -0.004  -0.13  -0.002  -0.06  0.004  0.17 
ADJ_ROA
t+3
  -0.062*  -1.79  0.003  0.09  0.030  1.12 
ADJ_ROA
t+4
  -0.148***  -3.96  -0.128***  -3.45  -0.060**  -1.97 
ADJ_ROA
t+5
  -0.197***  -4.91  -0.104**  -2.49  -0.101***  -2.99 
ADJ_ROA
t+6
  -0.069  -1.47  -0.009  -0.19  -0.039  -1.01 
Note: Table 5 shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability on 
the relation between use of cash and subsequent operating performance, measured by industry-
adjusted return on asset (ADJ_ROA). I restrict the sample to firms that have excess cash at year t 
and reduced their cash over year t and year t+1. Panel A shows the effect of financial statement 
comparability on the relation between use of cash and industry-adjusted return on asset in year t+4 
(ADJ_ROA
t+4
,). The sample is comprised of 5,775 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-
2013. Panel B shows the coefficient of COMPACCT𝑖,𝑡×𝛥𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1/NA𝑖,𝑡 for the regression model with 













). All the continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom 
one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal year and rescaled 
to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. See Appendix 
for other variable definition. The variable of interest is bolded. 
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Table 6. The effect of comparability on the investment sensitivity to corporate cash 
holdings 
  Dependent Variable = Capital Expenditure (𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒊,𝒕+𝟏/𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕) 
  (1)CompAcctIndavg  (2)CompAcctIndavg  (3) CompAcct4 
Variable  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.049***  9.70  0.017***  12.02  0.011***  5.83 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×COMPACCTi,t  0.046***  3.50  0.056***  9.85  0.049***  9.71 
𝐎𝐂𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝑵𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.026***  5.34  0.036***  17.65  0.036***  17.23 
𝑴𝑻𝑩𝒊,𝒕  0.000**  2.02  0.000**  2.75  0.000***  3.10 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒕  0.012***  6.51  0.002**  2.17  0.002***  2.46 
Year & industry  
fixed effect 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,470  30,470  30,470 
Adj. R2  0.282  0.288  0.287 
Note: Table 6 shows the regression result about the effect of comparability on the investment 
sensitivity to corporate cash holdings. The investment is proxied by capital expenditure of year t+1. 
To address for endogeneity between capital expenditure and cash level, this table uses two-staged 
least squares (2SLS) regression motivated by Denis and Sibilkov (2010). The sample is comprised 
of 30,470 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013 for each regression model. 
Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal year and rescaled to range 
between [0,1]. All the continuous variables are winsorized at top and bottom one-percentile. To 
adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. See Appendix for other variable 





Table 7. The effect of comparability on the market value of capital expenditure 
 








Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐱𝐩𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.010 -0.17 -0.028 -0.39 -0.055 -0.82 -0.078 -1.16 
∆𝑬𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.641 *** 25.31 0.630*** 25.54 0.629*** 26.27 0.626*** 25.10 
∆𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.184*** 15.68 0.171*** 14.75 0.178*** 15.97 0.176*** 15.18 
∆𝐑𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.076 0.35 0.103 0.48 0.091 0.44 0.144 0.67 
∆𝐈𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -1.112*** -5.19 -1.212*** -5.63 -1.192*** -5.68 -1.173*** -5.44 
∆𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 1.735*** 4.92 1.789*** 5.09 1.862*** 5.60 1.743*** 4.94 
𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐱𝐩𝒊,𝒕−𝟏/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.370 *** 8.37 0.373*** 8.73 0.367 *** 9.00 0.383*** 8.86 




𝐍𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.125*** -5.96 -0.101*** -4.90 -0.113*** -5.66 -0.116*** -5.61 
COMPACCTi,t   0.124*** 11.21 0.092*** 8.06 0.081*** 7.83 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐱𝐩𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏   0.268* 1.73 0.334** 2.35 0.474*** 2.78 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,214 19,214 19,214 19,214 
Adj. R2 0.168 0.174 0.171 0.170 
Note: Table 7 shows the regression results about the effect of comparability on the market value of 
capital expenditure. Motivated by Masulis et al. (2009), I use modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) 
specification to estimate the market value of capital expenditure. I restrict firms to have at least 5% 
increase in the capital expenditure from year t-1 to year t. The sample is comprised of 19,214 firm-
year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal year 
and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered 
by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. 




Table 8. The Impact of Comparability on the Market Value of Cash during Crisis and 
Non-crisis period 
Panel A: Comparability measured by CompAcctIndmed 




 2008~2009  Diff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.900  0.357  -0.543*** -3.08 
COMPACCTi,t  0.143  0.127  -0.016 -0.68 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.214  1.415  1.201*** 4.66 
Observations  35,042  2,953    
 
Panel B: Comparability measured by CompAcctIndavg 




 2008~2009  Diff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.922  0.460  -0.462*** -2.59 
COMPACCTi,t  0.115  0.094  -0.021 -0.89 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.180  1.187  1.007*** 3.99 
Observations  35,042  2,953    
 
Panel C: Comparability measured by CompAcct4 




 2008~2009  Diff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.854  0.535  -0.319* -1.74 
COMPACCTi,t  0.108  0.159  0.051** 2.11 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.318  0.833  0.515* 1.95 
Observations  35,042  2,953    
Note: Table 8 shows the regression results about the differential effects of financial statement 
comparability on the value of cash holdings in crisis and non-crisis period. The sample is comprised 
of 37,995 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are 
winsorized at top and bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within 
each fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors 
are clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level 
respectively. See Appendix for other variable definition. The variable of interest is bolded and 
shaded.   
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Table 9. The effect of financial statement comparability on the value of cash 
holdings controlling for corporate governance 
Panel A: Modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) specification controlling for corporate 
goverance 
 








Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.797*** 6.90 0.539*** 3.68 0.580*** 4.02 0.603*** 3.92 
∆𝑬𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.474*** 13.57 0.465*** 13.60 0.464*** 13.52 0.467*** 13.50 
∆𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.167*** 10.49 0.164*** 10.25 0.167*** 10.46 0.168*** 10.41 
∆𝐑𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.513 1.57 0.492 1.54 0.497 1.56 0.553* 1.69 
∆𝐈𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -1.788*** -6.41 -1.798*** -6.44 -1.788*** -6.39 -1.800*** -6.47 
∆𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.685 1.47 0.593 1.27 0.635 1.36 0.616 1.32 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.112*** 4.32 0.112*** 4.18 0.105*** 3.95 0.113*** 4.20 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.328*** -14.78 -0.311*** -13.60 -0.324*** -14.38 -0.320*** -13.83 
𝐍𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.178*** -5.08 -0.179*** -5.15 -0.179*** -5.16 -0.180*** -5.19 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.400*** -2.78 -0.217 -1.43 -0.235 -1.53 -0.267* -1.74 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.711*** -3.09 -0.633*** -2.79 -0.673*** -2.96 -0.612*** -2.64 
𝐆𝐨𝐯𝒊,𝒕 -0.031*** -4.74 -0.030*** -4.56 -0.031*** -4.70 -0.031*** -4.75 
𝐆𝐨𝐯𝒊,𝒕×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.238** 2.21 0.225** 2.12 0.226** 2.12 0.209* 1.95 
COMPACCTi,t   0.047*** 3.07 0.019 1.21 0.021 1.50 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.456** 2.53 0.377** 2.19 0.352* 1.93 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,941 7,941 7,941 7,941 




Panel B: The differential effect of financial statement comparability on value of cash holdings 
in strong and week corporate governance firms 
  Corporate Governance 
  Week Strong 
Varables  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒕𝑰𝒏𝒅𝑴𝒆𝒅i,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.368 1.29 0.792*** 3.14 
𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒕𝑰𝒏𝒅𝑨𝒗𝒈i,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.339 1.20 0.580** 2.54 
𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒕𝟒i,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.278 1.01 0.562** 2.23 
Note: This table shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability 
on the value of cash holdings controlling for corporate governance. The strength of corporate 
governance of a firm is measured using G-index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003). Consistent 
with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), I constructed a dummy governance measure by first forming 
tercile and second deleting the middle tercile group. I adjusted the measure so that higher number 
indicates a better governance. The sample is comprised of 7,941 firm-year observations over the 
period of 1990-2013. Panel A reports the effect of financial statement comparability on the value of 
cash holdings controlling for corporate governance. Panel B reports the differential effect of 
financial statement comparability on the value of cash holdings in strong corporate governance sub-
group and week governance sub-group. All the continuous variables are winsorized at top and 
bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal year and 
rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. 







Table 10. The effect of financial statement comparability on the value of cash 
holdings controlling for accrual quality  
 








Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.875*** 15.88 0.756*** 11.96 0.784*** 12.36 0.708*** 10.54 
∆𝑬𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.435*** 29.77 0.436*** 30.06 0.433*** 29.74 0.436*** 30.31 
∆𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.214*** 25.00 0.188*** 22.09 0.196*** 22.91 0.205*** 23.77 
∆𝐑𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.099 0.79 0.138 1.10 0.114 0.92 0.087 0.69 
∆𝐈𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.683*** -4.53 -0.751*** -5.05 -0.735*** -4.96 -0.714*** -4.78 
∆𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 1.169*** 4.85 1.200*** 5.10 1.199*** 5.08 1.128*** 4.76 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.070*** 6.29 0.116*** 9.86 0.104*** 8.97 0.088*** 7.64 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.198*** -20.14 -0.183*** -19.04 -0.192*** -20.02 -0.170*** -16.78 
𝐍𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.239*** -14.58 -0.195*** -12.13 -0.207*** -12.81 -0.224*** -13.82 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.360*** -5.93 -0.278*** -4.29 -0.285*** -4.39 -0.243*** -3.71 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.548*** -5.55 -0.547*** -5.55 -0.569*** -5.76 -0.459*** -4.54 
𝐀𝐐𝒊,𝒕 0.108*** 16.97 0.077*** 11.97 0.084*** 13.17 0.094*** 14.47 
𝐀𝐐𝒊,𝒕×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.211*** 2.65 0.160** 1.97 0.159** 1.96 0.172** 2.13 
COMPACCTi,t   0.139*** 19.30 0.114*** 16.09 0.072*** 10.02 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.307*** 3.53 0.252*** 3.01 0.368*** 3.98 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 33,398 33,398 33,398 33,398 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.175 0.173 0.169 
Note: Table 11 shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability on 
the value of cash holdings controlling for accrual quality. Accrual quality is proxied by modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure. The accrual quality measure is decile-ranked 
in each fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. The sample is comprised of 33,398 firm-
year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal and 
rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. 
See Appendix for other variable definition. The variable of interest is bolded.  
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Table 11. The effect of financial Statement comparability on the value of cash 
holdings controlling for accounting conservatism 
 








Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.851*** 10.72 0.652*** 6.75 0.660*** 6.70 0.642*** 6.65 
∆𝑬𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.394*** 19.62 0.404*** 20.36 0.399*** 20.16 0.402*** 20.31 
∆𝐍𝐀𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 0.183*** 16.97 0.167*** 15.68 0.175*** 16.33 0.174*** 16.27 
∆𝐑𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.433*** 2.65 0.428*** 2.65 0.4141*** 2.54 0.433*** 2.68 
∆𝐈𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.941*** -4.81 -0.927*** -4.78 -0.974*** -5.01 -0.970*** -4.98 
∆𝐃𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕-1 1.017*** 3.32 1.062*** 3.49 1.057*** 3.46 1.099*** 3.65 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.075*** 4.92 0.103*** 6.44 0.088*** 5.54 0.099*** 6.23 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.275*** -17.95 -0.234*** -15.15 -0.249*** -16.02 -0.234*** -14.87 
𝐍𝐅𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.209*** -9.66 -0.189*** -8.81 -0.196*** -9.05 -0.202*** -9.41 
𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.372*** -4.44 -0.231*** -2.58 -0.238*** -2.64 -0.244*** -2.72 
𝐋𝒊,𝒕−𝟏×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 -0.711*** -5.28 -0.705*** -5.21 -0.697*** -5.06 -0.593*** -4.36 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝒊,𝒕 -0.032*** -3.57 -0.025*** -2.83 -0.028*** -3.23 -0.027*** -3.12 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝒊,𝒕×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 0.191** 2.01 0.200** 2.11 0.213** 2.21 0.175* 1.85 
COMPACCTi,t   0.120*** 10.83 0.084*** 7.46 0.095*** 9.04 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏   0.464*** 4.12 0.400*** 3.66 0.470*** 4.03 
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,205 18,205 18,205 18,205 
Adj. R2 0.154 0.181 0.176 0.176 
Note: Table 10 shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability on 
the value of cash holdings controlling for accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism is 
proxied by the negative of the ratio of nonoperating accruals to total assets cumulated over the 
previous three years (Givoly and Hayn 2000). The accounting conservatism measure is decile-
ranked in each fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. The sample is comprised of 18,205 
firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are winsorized 
at top and bottom one-percentile. Comparability measures are ranked into deciles within each fiscal 
year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are 
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level 




Table 12. Regression analysis using alternative measure of comparability: Barth et al. 
(2012)  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for alternative comparability measure 
 
Panel B: Regression analysis using modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) specification: 
Note: Table 12 shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability on 
the value of cash holdings using alternative definition of comparability. In this alternative definition 
of comparability, Following Kim et al. (2016), modified Barth et al. (2012) specification is 
employed to estimate firm specific accounting function. Specifically, the following regression is 
estimated to compute firm level accounting function:  ri,t = α0 + α1×𝐸i,t/Mi,t-1 + α2×∆Ei,t/
Mi,t-1+α3×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + α4×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡×Ei,t/Mi,t-1+α5×𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡×∆Ei,t/Mi,t-1+εi,t. The sample is comprised 
of 27,792 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1 percentile and 99 percentiles. Comparability measures are decile ranked within each 
fiscal year and rescaled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are 
clustered by firm. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values; *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. The variable of interest is bolded and 
shaded. 
  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 27,792 -31.740 42.053 -33.797 -19.861 -11.924 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 27,792 -48.872 70.055 -48.856 -26.202 -16.227 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡4𝑖,𝑡 27,792 -10.920 11.800 -13.195 -7.780 -4.276 
  Dependent Variable = Annual excess return (ri,t - Ri,t
B ) 
  (1)CompAcctIndmed  (2)CompAcctIndavg  (3)CompAcct4 
COMPACCTi,t  0.106*** (12.34)  0.105*** (12.01)  0.099*** (12.03) 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.730*** (7.08)  0.649*** (6.19)  0.266*** (2.86) 
Adj. R2  0.168  0.168  0.166 
Observations  27,792  27,792  27,792 
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Table 13. Regression analysis using alternative measure of comparability: Choi et al. 
(2017) 
 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for alternative comparability measure 
 
Panel B: Regression analysis using modified Faulkender and Wang (2005) specification 
  Dependent Variable = Annual excess return (ri,t - Ri,t
B ) 
  (1)CompAcctIndmed  (2)CompAcctIndavg  (3)CompAcct4 
COMPACCTi,t  0.108*** (12.22)  0.078*** (8.56)  0.085*** (9.84) 
COMPACCTi,t×∆𝐂𝒊,𝒕/𝐌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  0.483*** (4.27)  0.409*** (3.66)  0.353*** (3.11) 
Adj. R2  0.181  0.178  0.178 
Observations  27,450  27,450  27,450 
Note: Table 12 shows the regression results about the effect of financial statement comparability on 
the value of cash holdings using alternative definition of comparability. In this alternative definition 
of comparability, Cash Flow from Operation is used instead of stock return to proxy for economic 
event (Choi et al. 2017). Specifically, the following regression is estimated to compute firm level 
accounting function: Ei,t/Mi,t-1 = α0 + α1× OCFi,t/Mi,t-1 + εi,t. . The sample is comprised of 27,450 
firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2013. All the continuous variables are winsorized 
at 1 percentile and 99 percentiles. Comparability measures are decile ranked within each fiscal year 
and recalled to range between [0,1]. To adjust for heteroscedasticity, standard errors are clustered 
by firm. The numbers in the parenthesis are t-values; *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at a 0.10, a 0.05, and a 0.01 level respectively. The variable of interest is bolded and shaded 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 27,450 -2.631 2.576 -3.069 -1.730 -1.088 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑖,𝑡 27,450 -3.280 2.578 -3.723 -2.480 -1.778 






본 연구는 회계정보의 비교가능성이 기업 보유 현금의 시장 가치에 미치는 
영향에 대해서 분석한다. 1990 년부터 2013 년까지 미국 기업의 정보를 
이용해 분석한 결과, 회계정보의 비교가능성이 높은 기업들은 그렇지 않은 
기업보다 보유 현금의 시장 가치가 높게 평가되는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 
회계정보의 비교가능성이 높은 기업들은 비교가능성이 낮은 기업보다 (1) 
보유 잉여 현금을 지출할 경우 미래 총자산이익율 (ROA)이 높았고, (2) 보유 
현금 대비 자본 지출의 민감도가 높았으며, (3) 자본 지출 액의 시장 평가 
금액이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 더불어 회계정보의 비교가능성이 기업 보유 
현금의 시장 가치에 미치는 영향은 비금융위기 기간(1990-2007, 2010-
2013)보다 금융위기 기간(2008-2009)에서 더 크게 나타났다. 위 결과는 
회계 정보의 비교가능성이 잉여 현금흐름에 나타나는 대리인 문제를 
해결하는 데 크게 기여한 다는 것을 보여준다.  
 
 
주요어: 회계정보의 비교가능성, 보유 현금의 시장가치, 잉여현금흐름, 대리인 
문제  
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